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THE BOARD OF INDUSTRIAL INSURANCE APPEALS
AFTER NINE YEARS: A PARTIAL EVALUATION
DONALD H. WOLLEIT*
ADMINISTRATIVE PROCEEDINGS UNDER THE WASHINGTON
INDUSTRIAL INSURANCE ACT
Antecedents of the Board of Industrial Insurance Appeals. Prior
to 1949 the Department of Labor and Industries adjusted claims made
under the Washington Industrial Insurance Act' arising out of indus-
trial injury, death, and disease, subject to review by the superior
courts. Initial determinations were made ex parte by the Supervisor
of Industrial Insurance. Appellate determinations, where a re-hearing
was requested, were made by the Joint Board, consisting of the
Director of the Department and two of his subordinates-the same
Supervisor of Industrial Insurance who had made the initial deter-
mination, and the Supervisor of Safety.
The Joint Board's primary function was quasi-judicial. However,
since the tribunal consisted of the departmental officer whose order
was the subject of the appeal, his administrative chief, and another
subordinate of that chief, the procedure was aptly described as an
example of the "defendant-judge" combination.2
Moreover, while the members of the Joint Board were required to
consider the record in making their decision, the hearing was actually
conducted by an examiner who, because there was no one else from
the Department present, performed the dual function of hearing
officer and departmental advocate. Cases were tried piecemeal. Instead
of requiring each party to put on his evidence and make his case at a
single hearing, the Joint Board scheduled separate hearings for pres-
entation of the claimant's, employer's, and department's cases. There
was usually a considerable lapse of time between hearings, and they
were often held under different examiners.
The orders of the Joint Board were singularly unrevealing of the
process whereby they were reached. The orders were entered on a
printed form (in blank spaces) stating simply whether the Super-
* Professor of Law, University of Washington.
The author wishes to acknowledge his gratitude to Mr. Wilbur (Brick) Lawrence,
former Board chairman, and Mr. Richard Callahan, a present Board member, for
their cooperation. He is also indebted to several other lawyers for their assistance,
particularly the late Harold A. Seering, Judge of the Superior Court of King County.
However, the responsibility for statements made in this article is entirely the author's.
I RCW 51.
2 Rutledge, A New Tribunal of the State of Washington, 26 WASH. L. Rnv. 196,
197 (1951).
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visor's order was sustained or reversed. There were no findings of
fact, nor was there any clue as to the ground upon which the Board
had based its decision.
Proceedings Before the Board of Industrial Insurance Appeals. The
Board of Industrial Insurance Appeals' was created by legislative
enactment in 1949 (it came into existence on June 17 of that year)
and replaced the Joint Board.- It has two principal distinguishing
characteristics.
First, the Board is completely independent of the Department. It
consists of three persons: a public member (who is a lawyer), an
industry member, and a labor member, all appointed by the Gov-
ernor. Second, the decisions of the Board contain findings of fact
and legal conclusions as to each contested issue, together with the
order, and include a statement of the Board's jurisdiction, the nature
of the injury, the pathological condition, if any, which resulted, the
physiological disability, if any, resulting from such condition, and
the percentage of statutory disability, if any. This practice of writing
up orders with painstaking care started as the result of an administra-
tive decision and subsequently became a statutory requirement.5
The Board has carried forward the examiner system, including the
business of trying cases piecemeal. However, after an initial lag
which was the subject of some protest,6 the examiners were relieved
of the responsibility for making the case in support of the Depart-
ment's order. The Attorney General now represents the Department
in appeals before the Board, as well as in appeals before the courts7
The jurisdiction of the Board is limited to the issues raised by the
Supervisor's order and the notice setting forth the grounds for
appeal.8 Both the claimant (a workman or his beneficiary) and the
employer have standing to appeal.9 Obviously the Department, since
its order is the matter at issue, does not have standing to appeal.1"
The Board proceeds de novo, that is, it considers the case as if no
3 For an excellent description and analysis of the work of the Board after two years
of operation, see Id.
'WASH. SEss. LAWS, c. 219 (1949).
5 RCW 51.52.106.
6 See Karlen v. Dept., 41 Wn.2d 301, 249 P2d 364 (1952).7 This dual responsibility sometimes places the Attorney General in the position of
defending before the superior court a Board order which is inconsistent with the
Departmental order which he defended before the Board.
8 Brakus v. Dept., 48 Wn.2d 218, 292 P.2d 865 (1956). The basic issue before the
Board is the correctness of the Supervisor's order.
11 RCW 51.52.050.
10 State ex rel. Dunbar v. Olson, 172 Wash. 424, 20 P.2d 850 (1933).
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order had been entered by the Supervisor and decides the case solely
on the basis of the record made before it."
SuPERiOR COURT REvrmw OF THE BoARD's ORDER AND THE
DE Novo JuRy TRLmi
Both the claimant and the employer have standing to appeal the
Board's order to the superior court." The jurisdiction of the superior
court on appeal is limited to the issues of law or fact that were raised
in the appeal to the Board or in the Board proceedings."
The Department, while it is a party to the Board proceeding, is not
a "person aggrieved" by a Board order and cannot obtain superior
court review either under the statute4 or by certiorari." However,
a 1957 amendment to the Act permits the Department to appeal to
the superior courts from Board orders reversing the Supervisor on a
question of law or on the "mandatory administrative actions" of the
Director."6
The superior court proceeds de novo, although it takes no testimony
and hears no witnesses.'7 The evidence before it consists entirely of
the record made before the Board. While the Board's findings and
decision are prima facie correct and the burden of overcoming their
presumptive validity is fixed upon the appellant, 8 a case for the jury
is made if there is substantial evidence in the record to support the
appellant's version of the facts. 9 The parties supporting the Board's
order are entitled to an instruction advising the jury of its prima facie
validity, but a jury verdict adverse to the Board will be sustained
"1 Olympia Brewing Co. v. Dept., 34 Wn.2d 498, 208 P.2d 1181 (1949). The Board
may not consider the Departmental file unless it is offered and admitted under the
rules of evidence applicable to courts of law.
"2 RCW 51.52.110.
Is RCW 51.52.115. The basic issue before the court is the correctness of the Super-
visor's order as modified by the Board (if it was modified). It seems to follow that
the superior court may consider everything which the Supervisor decided to which the
appellant raised objection in his notice of appeal to the Board. However, the Supreme
Court, with two judges disagreeing, has held that the superior court's inquiry is lim-
ited to questions actually decided by the Board. Lunz v. Dept., 150 Wash. Dec. 261,
310 P.2d 880 (1957).
14 Dept. v. Cook, 44 Wn.2d 671, 269 P.2d 962 (1954). The Department does, how-
ever, have standing to appeal to the Supreme Court from a judgment of the superior
court.
15 State ex rel. Bates v. Board, 151 Wash. Dec. 106, 316 P.2d 467 (1957). But see
Trapp v. Dept., 48 Wn.2d 560, 295 P.2d 315 (1956).
16 WASn. SESs. LAws c. 70, pp. 302-303 (1957).
'7 RCW 51.52.115.
18 Id. There is, however, no presumption that the Department's findings are correct.
Brakus v. Dept., 48 Wn2d 218, 292 P.2d 865 (1956). Cf. Litke v. Dept., 2 Wn.2d 536,
98 P.2d 981 (1940). And the question of who had the burden of proof at the Board
level is immaterial. La Vera v. Dept., 45 Wn.2d 413, 275 P.2d 426 (1954).
19 Preston Mill Co. v. Dept., 44 Wn.2d 532, 268 P.2d 1017 (1954). See also Halder
v. Dept., 44 Wn.2d 537, 268 P.2d 1020 (1954).
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if it is supported by substantial evidence." Thus, as a practical mat-
ter, the presumption means nothing except to the extent that the jury
understands the instruction and takes it seriously.
EVALUATION OF THE EFFECTIVENESS OF THE BOARD
Appeals from the Department to the Board and from the Board
to the superior court are costly, not only to the parties but also to the
state. The drain on funds occasioned simply by the operation of the
Board is obvious. In addition, the state pays the cost of supporting
the Department's order at the Board level and the Board's order at
the superior court level, the Attorney General making the supporting
case at each stage. Moreover, if an appellant successfully attacks a
Board order in the superior court, his costs (including the attorney's
fee fixed by the court and the fees of witnesses) are paid by the
Department."1
Some idea of the direct costs of operating a system that provides
for two de novo trials of fact instead of one can be acquired by exam-
ining legislative appropriations for the 1957-1959 Biennium. These
appropriations are made from the accident fund, which is totally sup-
ported by employer contributions, and the medical fund, which is
supported by equal employer and employee contributions.
The figures are as follows: 2
From the accident and medical funds to the Board of
Industrial Insurance Appeals for salaries, wages, and
operations ........................................................................ $ 663,131.00
From the accident and medical funds to the Department
of Labor and Industries for appeal costs (salaries,
wages, and operations) ................................................. $ 598,818.0023
T otal ................................................................................ $1,261,949.00
Since the total of $1,261,949.00 does not include the costs to the
taxpayers of jury trials in industrial insurance cases, i.e., jury fees
and court costs (to say nothing of the costs to all litigants who suffer
delays because industrial insurance cases clog the courts' dockets,
2 0 Id.
21 RCW 51.52.130. But such costs and fees are not paid by the Department when
the worlman or beneficiary successfully resists an appeal. Harbor Plywood Corp. v.
Dept., 48 Wn.2d 553, 295 P.2d 310 (1956). Cf. Trapp v. Dept., 48 Wn.2d 560, 295 P.2d
315 (1956). See St. Paul & Tacoma Lumber Co. v. Dept., 19 Wn.2d 639, 144 P.2d 250
(1943) (attorney's fee, payable by the Department, authorized for successful employer
appellant).22 WAsia. SEss. LAws c. 301, pp. 1239, 1252 (1957).
23 It is estimated that about one-third of the appeal costs of the Department arise
from the handling of appeals to the Board, the balance being used for appeals to the
superior courts and the supreme court.
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particularly during jury terms), the figure represents considerably less
than the actual aggregate public expense of operating the present
system. A realistic figure which included all cost items would be
substantially higher.
The question is: Is this system of providing two successive de novo
trials worth what it costs? The question itself suggests the sound
answer. That answer is no. The procedure involves a wasteful dupli-
cation of functions. Moreover, it is anomalous, since the remedy
which the Industrial Insurance Act provides to workmen in lieu of
a common law tort remedy is supposed to be speedy. Either the
Board trial or the jury trial should go. The question becomes:
Which one?
Case for Elimination of the Jury Trial. If one indulges in the pre-
sumption that administrative agencies have an expertise that makes
their judgment superior to that of a lay jury, the answer is easy. It
is not necessary to presume that the Board is expert and the jury
is not. It is only necessary to presume that the Board's judgment is
apt to be better than the jury's.
The argument in favor of elimination of the jury is appealing.
Take, for example, a heart case where the result turns on a question
of medical fact. The issue is: Is it more likely than not that a par-
ticular happening which occurred during employment was a con-
tributing factor to the onset of the heart attack at the time it occurred,
and without which happening the onset of the attack would not have
occurred when it did?2" The Board can be expected to bring to bear
on such subsidiary questions as the qualifications of the medical wit-
nesses and the weight of their testimony a fund of experience not
possessed by a jury. As Professor Rutledge has put it:
By a process of self-education they [the members of a workmen's
compensation tribunal] can determine with greater precision than,
say, a judge [or a jury] who less frequently deals with medical ques-
tions, not what "the going medical rules" are, but what help the
sciences of medicine can give. By a process of acquiring familiarity
with the reputations of medical practitioners and others who may be
called as expert witnesses, they can obtain insights for the evaluation
of qualifications of expert witnesses. So long as their decisions are
binding on judicial review in terms of the substantial evidence formula
it will not greatly matter, except to save time in the proceedings,
whether the evaluation of qualifications is expressed in a decision on
24 Rutledge, Proposed Procedure for Administering Heart Cases Under the ash-
ington Industrial Insurance Act, 31 WASHt. L. Rxv. 67, 69-70 (1956). See Mork v.
Dept, 48 Wn.2d 74, 291 P2d 650 (1955).
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the qualification of the proferred expert or in a decision on the weight
of his evidence. (Italics supplied) 25
Take, for another example, a case where the result turns on the
question of the degree of maximum unspecified permanent partial
disability. Assuming that there is no substantial disagreement about
the medical facts, i.e., the pathological condition of the workman (e.g.,
he has an herniated intervetebral disc) and its physiological effects
(e.g., he can no longer perform labor involving stooping, bending, or
lifting), the issue is: What is the degree of his loss of bodily function
measured by the actual work that he can perform?2" It is not too
much to suppose that the members of the Board, who are continually
preoccupied with this question, are able to translate medical facts
into vocational and compensable disability with more exactness than
the members of a jury.2 7
The present system indulges in the reverse presumption. It not
only presumes that a jury's judgment on such questions, where there
is substantial evidence to support contrary findings, is as good as the
Board's. It also presumes that the jury's judgment is better, since
that is the judgment that ultimately prevails." Since two bites at the
apple are better than one, the temptation to appeal from Board find-
ings which rest upon inferences and determinations as to credibility
and weight, as many of them do, is often compelling.
The Board also has another advantage, which operates in all kinds
of cases. The jury, since it is limited to consideration of the record
made before the Board, has no opportunity to consider the demeanor
of the witnesses, a piece of evidence which bears directly on issues of
weight and credibility. While the only fact finder in the administra-
25 Rutledge, Medical Witnesses in Workmen's Compensation, 32 IND. L.J. 313, 324
(1957).
26 Franks v. Dept., 35 Wn.2d 763, 216 P.2d 416 (1950). But see Dowell v. Dept.,
151 Wash. Dec. 391, 319 P.2d 843 (1957) (The question is: What is the degree of
incapacity to work measured by loss of bodily function?). The fact finders' experience
will doubtless influence their answer to this mixed question of fact and law, but they
invite reversal if they admit it. See Kaiser Aluminum and Chemical Corp. v. Dept.,
45 Wn.2d 745, 277 P.2d 742 (1954).
27 The degree of vocational and compensable disability is not a question of 'medical
fact within the sphere of training and experience of medical witnesses. Nonetheless,
it is common practice for doctors to testify in such terms. If the Board accepts such
testimony as conclusive, it in effect delegates the performance of its function to mem-
bers of the medical profession. Moreover, it invites the jurors to shirk their responsi-
bility in the same way, although the jury will not necessarily, in choosing between
conflicting conclusions of statutory disability reached by doctors, make the same choice
that the Board did.
2s See, for an example of how the presumption that the Board's findings are correct
is replaced in the process by a much stronger presumption that the jury's contrary
findings are correct, Preston Mill Co. v. Dept., 44 Wn.2d 532, 268 P.2d 1017 (1954).
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tive process who actually "receives" demeanor evidence may be the
trial examiner (except in those hearings where a board member sits
in), his tentative draft of findings, together with the record, give
the Board members information about what went on at the hear-
ing which, while not the equivalent of being at the hearing, is cer-
tainly superior to the knowledge the jurors have.
An obvious solution is to change the legislation so as to remove
juries from the appellate structure, restrict judicial review to ques-
tions of law (e.g., did the Board exceed its statutory authority?), and
require only that the Board's findings of fact be supported by com-
petent, material, and substantial evidence. Enactment of the Model
State Administrative Procedure Act would accomplish this result."3
Obstacles to Elimination of the Jury Trial. There are, however,
serious obstacles to this suggestion, the principal one being historical
and political. The jury trial has been a part of the administration of
industrial insurance in this state since the beginning. The original
Act of 1911 gave injured workmen a direct appeal to the superior
court from the award of the Industrial Insurance Commission, which
was the agency charged with the responsibility of administering the
Act. The calling of a jury to resolve questions of fact rested in the
discretion of the court. However, if the court did call a jury, its
verdict was given the same effect as jury verdicts are given in actions
at law; that is, it would not be disturbed if there was substantial
evidence to support it."0
The Joint Board was established in 1927.21 The workman's right
to appeal to the superior court was preserved, but before he could
take such an appeal he had to petition the Joint Board for a re-hear-
ing of the Supervisor's order and await its decision. The calling of
a jury remained discretionary with the court, and the force of a jury
verdict remained unchanged. 2
In 1938 the Washington Supreme Court handed down three deci-
sions, each of which held that in industrial insurance cases the jury's
verdict "on questions of fact... is not controlling upon the court,
29 The constitutional requirement of separation of powers does not prevent the broad
review of the decisions of a quasi-judicial tribunal which the present system permits.
Floyd v. Dept., 44 Wn.2d 560, 269 P.2d 563 (1954). At the other extreme constitutional
requirements of due process do not prevent the narrow review of such decisions which
Section 13 of the Model State Administrative Procedure Act permits. Crowell v.
Benson, 285 U.S. 22 (1932).
o Rem. Rev. Stat. 7697. See Taylor v. Ind. Ins. Comm., 120 Wash. 4, 206 Pac. 973
(1922).
3 1 WASH. SEss. LAWS c. 310, §8 (1927).
Kelly v. Dept., 172 Wash. 525, 20 P.2d 1105 (1933) and Gatterdam v. Dept., 185
Wash. 628, 56 P.2d 693 (1936).
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but merely advisory;" that is, the court, after considering the entire
record, "can adopt it or reject it."" Almost immediately (1939) the
legislature amended the statute, entitling the parties to a superior
court appeal to a trial by jury upon demand, according to the jury's
verdict in every such appeal "the same force and effect as in actions
at law,"3" and providing that the trial should be de novo on a cold
record. This language has been carried over into RCW 51.52.115.
The Washington Supreme Court, in its first case construing this
amendment, commented:
The provisions of the statute are somewhat unique, in that the verdict
of the jury is made final upon evidence produced from typewritten or
printed pages, and not from the mouths of witnesses present at the
trial wherein they may be seen and heard and their demeanor consid-
ered by the jury. Much value is always attached to the verdict of thejury because of the fact that the witnesses are seen and heard during
the trial, where the weight of the evidence and the credibility of the
various witnesses may be considered.... By enacting the statute just
quoted, the legislature changed its former laws relative to jury trials
in two particulars. First, in directing that in an industrial insurance
appeal either party is entitled to a jury trial as a matter of right, and
that the verdict of the jury shall have the same force and effect as in
actions at law.35
Subsequent attempts to eliminate the jury trial have been unsuc-
cessful, and there is little reason to believe that a frontal assault today
would be any more successful than it has been in the past.
If, then, the jury trial is unassailable, the realistic way to achieve
a more efficient administration of the industrial insurance act is to
provide for direct appeals from Departmental orders to the superior
courts with "live" jury trials and either to eliminate the Board entirely
or change its function to that of an informal, compromising (purely
administrative) body whose decisions would have no probative force
or effect in proceedings before the courts and would be inadmissible
in evidence."
3a Russell v. Dept., 194 Wash. 565, 573, 78 P.2d 960 (1938) ; Hodgen v. Dept., 194
Wash. 541, 78 P.2d 949 (1938); and Devlin v. Dept, 194 Wash. 549, 78 P.2d 952(1938).
34 WAS H. SEss. LAws c. 184 §1 (1939).
35 Alfredson v. Dept., 5 Wn.2d 648, 651, 652, 105 P.2d 37 (1940).
36 The latter suggestion is substantially the proposal which was made a few years
ago by a Committee on Appellate Procedure in Workmen's Compensation Cases of
the Association of Superior Court Judges. Such a change would, if adopted, mean
that the appeal of a workman from a Board decision would be heard as if it were an
original appeal from the Department's order. It would eliminate the so-called "free
ride" appeal of the present system under which a claimant can take an increase in the
award made by the Board and appeal to the courts with much to gain and little to lose.
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Toward Atrophy of the Jury Trial. There is, however, a middle
course. The fact that the parties to a case before the Board have a
right to seek a de novo jury review of the Board's findings does not
in itself produce a duplication of functions. Such waste occurs only
if that right is exercised.
Appeals involve delay and expense (or the risk of expense, since
the Department pays the appellant's costs only if he is successful).
The decision as to whether or not to appeal any case is ordinarily
reached by weighing the estimated value of the bird in the bush, the
chances of catching him, and the costs of the hunt against the value
of the bird in hand. It follows that an objective measure of the
Board's effectiveness and utility is provided by examining the degree
of its success in gaining acceptance of its decisions, i.e., the extent to
which its performance has reduced the number and percentage of
appeals to the superior courts.
The statistical record of the Board of Industrial Insurance Appeals,
when compared with that of the predecessor Joint Board, is good."'
Such success as the Board has had is probably explained largely by
four factors: (1) the care with which the Board's orders, as compared
with those of its predecessor, are drawn; (2) the statutory require-
ment that the court advise the jury by instruction of the exact find-
ings of the Board on each material issue before it;"8 (3) the fact that
the Board is independent of the claims adjuster (the Department);
and (4) improvement in procedures, especially the removal of adver-
sary functions from the trial examiners and more extensive use of pre-
hearing conferences.
It seems reasonable to suppose that (1), (3), and (4) have caused
claimants and employers to have more confidence in the work of the
Board than they had in the work of its predecessor and hence to be
more disposed to accept its decisions. It also seems likely that (1)
and (2) explain, at least in part, why the percentage of Board orders
reversed by juries has declined, and it seems probable that this fact
has, in turn, discouraged appeals.
Plainly the situation has improved markedly since 1947, when 73
per cent of the Joint Board's decisions were appealed and 88 per cent
The proposal would doubtless operate to deter appeals, particularly if it were coupled
with a provision denying to the workman recovery of his costs and attorney's fee
unless he received in superior court an award greater than the one allowed by the
Board. Conversely, it might be provided that, if the workman successfully resisted an
employer appeal, his costs and attorney's fee would be assessed against the employer.
37 For a table showing disposition of appeals from the Board to the superior courts,
see Appendix A.
88 RCW 51.52.115.
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of the appeals were successful. The Board may properly be com-
mended on the improvement reflected by the fact that during the
years 1950-1956, inclusive, on the average approximately 49 per cent
of its appealable orders were appealed, with about 50 per cent suc-
cesses. Indeed, the percentage of successful appeals fell to 34 per
cent and 37 per cent in the years 1953 and 1955, respectively. How-
ever, the percentage of appeals, particularly successful ones, is still
too high. There are several steps that might be taken, without tam-
pering with the statute, and with a reasonable expectation of improv-
ing the situation.
Board Procedures. First, the practice of trying cases piecemeal
should be eliminated insofar as practicable. The statute permits the
Board to continue hearings, either on its own motion or on the motion
of the parties." But the latter may be granted only on "good cause
shown in the record to prevent hardship." It is sometimes easy to
confuse inconvenience with hardship, particularly where the witnesses
are medical doctors. The routine granting of continuances involves
inordinate delay and is not likely to inspire confidence in the pro-
ceedings.
It is unrealistic, however, to fix the responsibility for this practice
solely on the Board. Piecemeal hearings have, over the years, become
the accepted way of trying these cases, with the parties themselves
perhaps becoming more tolerant of the procedure than the Board.
The practice of some counsel of seeking continuances without a proper
showing of cause and the failure of other counsel to insist on adher-
ence to the statutory provisions governing the granting of continuances
are doubtless major reasons for the fact that the practice has per-
sisted.4"
Second, while the present (and laudible) policy of the Board is to
schedule a pre-hearing conference in about 75 per cent of the cases, "
there is reason to believe that there is room for improvement in the
mode and method of the proceeding. The conference technique
approaches optimum effectiveness only when it is free of the rigidities
and game-playing or jousting which often characterize the adversary
process. The function of the Board is primarily administrative, not
0 RCW 51.52.102.
"oBiennial Report for 1951, Board of Industrial Insurance Appeals, pp. 27-28.
4a Conferences are not scheduled in cases where (a) the Department totally
rejected the claim because, for example, the injury did not occur in the course of extra-
hazardous employment, or (b) the Department, after reopening the case, affirmed its
prior decision, or (c) the claimant is a non-resident of the state and is not represented
by a lawyer.
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quasi-judicial, in this context, and it calls for active participation in
the process of identifying the issues and the facts relevant to them.4'
The conference is the most promising single method for reducing
appeals to the superior courts. Obviously, if more agreements are
reached pursuant to such proceedings, fewer appealable orders will be
entered. If other factors remain constant, the result will be a decrease
in the percentage of total cases that reach the superior courts.
It is significant, and to the Board's credit, that almost 40 per cent
of the orders issued in recent years have been based upon settlements
reached by conference or stipulation. 2 This accounts in large measure
for the fact that, while the percentage of appeals taken from appeal-
able orders has remained high and relatively stable, the percentage
of appeals taken from final Board orders, excluding remands to the
Department, has declined as follows: 1950: 33 per cent; 1951: 29
per cent; 1952: 25 per cent; 1953: 23.6 per cent; 1954: 17 per cent;
1955: 20 per cent; 1956: 16 per cent; and 1957: 9.5 per cent.
The pre-hearing conference may perform at least two other useful
functions. Even if it does not accomplish settlement, it may produce
agreement as to the issues and the number of expert witnesses and
stipulations which reduce the area of controversy-thus achieving
substantial savings of time and money during the hearing."' More-
over, in an informal and flexible pre-hearing conference impartial and
informed medical opinion may often be obtained without the waste
of the time of the expert which is usually required by formal adver-
sary proceedings unless continuances are readily granted. For exam-
41 See, for example, Georgia-Pacific Plywood Co. v. Dept, 47 Wn.2d 893, 290 P.2d
718 (1955), in which the Court criticized the Board for disposing of a workman's
claim for compensation growing out of an occupational disease on an adversary basis,limiting its jurisdiction to the issue of aggravation raised by the notice of appeal,
rather than initiating an informal conference to get at the primary question of whether
he was entitled to benefits on any basis.The Board may direct the holding of conferences, before or during hearing, eitheron its own motion or on the motion of the parties. RCW 51.52.095. Sections 5.3 and
5.4 of the Board's Rules of Procedure, promulgated August 30, 1951, pursuant to RCW51.52.020, deal with conferences and state that "the parties may agree upon: (1) asettlement concerning final disposition of the appeal; or (2) simplification or limita-tion of the issues to be heard in the appeal, admissions to avoid unnecessary proof,
limitation upon the number of expert witnesses, and such other matters as may aid inhearing the appeal in an expeditious manner." Section 5.6 provides for pre-hearingdiscovery practice.
Perhaps the clearest cases for administrative disposition are those in which theDepartment and its counsel conclude, at the time of preparation for a board hearing,that the evidence does not support the Supervisor's order and that the claimant should
be offered an increased award.42 ra table showing disposition of appeals from the Department to the Board,
see Appendix B.
-1 See Footnote 41.
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ple, in an appropriate case the Board may, as it does now, direct
examination of the claimant by an ad hoc medical commission, and
receive its written report as evidence for conference purposes.4
Third, the Board should publish an index to its decisions. The
Board's present practice of publishing its decisions is commendable,
but if they are not drawn together in volume form and indexed, they
have no utility to a potential appellant who is looking for guideposts
against which to judge the merits of his case or to evaluate the Board's
decision in his case.
Jury Instructions. Fourth, and this suggestion points to the Attor-
ney General and the superior court judges rather than the Board, it
seems likely that the superior courts can exercise more effective con-
trol over juries in industrial insurance cases than they apparently are
exercising at present. A jury will completely duplicate the Board's
function if it receives a case under a set of instructions which, in effect
although not in form, gives it the full latitude of the substantial
evidence rule on all disputed questions.
In determining what issues should be tried by a jury the courts
attempt to follow the orthodox question-of-law--question-of-fact
dichotomy, withholding the former and submitting the latter. The
distinction is not always easy to make, and the results reached are
sometimes puzzling." However, since the overwhelming bulk of indus-
trial insurance cases turn on issues of fact or mixed fact and law, the
distinction is not often important."
A case will be withheld or withdrawn from the jury and the Board's
findings will be sustained if the evidence or inferences to be drawn
44 See Rutledge, Medical Witnesses it Worknea's Compensation, 32 IND. L.J. 313,
329 (1957).4
6 See, for example, St. Paul & Tacoma Lumber Co. v. Dept., 19 Wn.2d 639, 144
P.2d 250 (1943). The case was tried to the court, and the issue was whether the Joint
Board's determinations were entitled to the statutory presumption of validity. The
court held that they were not because they were conclusions of law rather than findings
of fact. Insofar as the court held that an occupational disease, in a statutory sense,
must be due to conditions normally and constantly present in, and characteristic of, an
occupation, the decision seems clear. But the court apparently also held that whether
intense dust prevails in the sawmill industry and whether a workman contracted
cardiac asthma through exposure to such dust are questions of law.
40For example, probably the majority of the cases that get to the superior court
level turn on the question of the percentage of unspecified permanent partial disability.
This involves a determination as to the loss of bodily function caused by the injury.
This is measured, in turn, either by comparison with the specified disability which
the unspecified disability most closely resembles or by a judgment as to the degree of
the workman's vocational disability. This is a question of fact or, no matter what
it is called, it is a question for the jury. See Ziniewicz v. Dept., 23 Wn.2d 436, 161
P.2d 315 (1945) (It is for the jury to determine, on the basis of the evidence, which
specified disability to use as the basis of comparison). See also Hyman v. Dept., 27
Wn.2d 301, 178 P.2d 347 (1947).
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therefrom are such that the minds of reasonable men could not differ."
Conversely, a case will be submitted to a jury if the evidence is such
that the minds of reasonable men may have a difference of opinion
about it, even though the appellant has adduced no evidence contrary
to the Board's findings but has undertaken only to establish that the
record provides insufficient support to those findings."
Such a broad concept of the scope of the jury's power in industrial
insurance cases seems to be a logical corollary of the statutory man-
date that the review is de novo and that the jury's verdict is entitled
to the same force and effect as in actions at law; that is, it must not
be disturbed if there is substantial evidence to support it. 9 It is not
easy, however, to reconcile this doctrine with the statutory direction
that the Board's findings are prima facie correct, i.e., presumptively
valid, and that the burden of overcoming the presumption is fixed
upon the appellant."
It could be argued with considerable force that the question of
whether the appellant's evidence overcomes the presumption that the
administrative order is correct is for the judge, and that he should
withhold or withdraw the case from the jury if the record is such that
reasonable men could not conclude that the Board's findings were
against the weight of the evidence. However, the Supreme Court held
to the contrary in A1Jredson v. Department of Labor and Industries,5 1
4' Cyr v. Dept., 47 Wn.2d 92, 286 P2d 1038 (1955) ; Hyde v. Dept., 46 Wn.2d 31,
278 P.2d 390 (1955) ; Fitzgerald v. Dept., 45 Wn.2d 642, 276 P.2d 957 (1954) ; Phil-
lips v. Dept., 49 Wn.2d 195, 298 P.2d 1117 (1956). See also Peterson v. Dept., 40
Wn.2d 635, 245 P.2d 1161 (1952) (motion to dismiss lies at anytime, e.g., after appel-
lant has made his case in chief. But such a motion calls for consideration of the entire
record).
48 Preston Mill Co. v. Dept., 44 Wn.2d 532, 268 P.2d 1017 (1954) (motion for judg-
ment n.o.v.) ; Abbott v. Dept., 49 Wn.2d 774, 307 P.2d 254 (1957) (motion to dismiss
prior to trial).
'1RCW 51.52.115. However, the Supreme Court has been rigorous in applying
the requirement that the evidence must be substantial. The causal relationship between
extrahazardous employment and occupational disease must be established by medical
testimony. Parr v. Dept., 46 Wn.2d 144, 278 P.2d 666 (1955). Accord as to the causal
relationship between industrial injury and the onset of a heart attack: Petersen v.
Dept., 40 Wn.2d 635, 245 P.2d 1161 (1952). In an aggravation case the workman must
prove by medical evidence, some of which is based on objective findings, that there
was an aggravation resulting in increased disability between the date the original claim
was closed by the Supervisor and the date the Supervisor rejected the claim for
aggravation. Johnson v. Dept., 45 Wn.2d 71, 273 P.2d 510 (1954); Prince v. Dept.,
47 Wn.2d 98, 286 P.2d 707 (1955). Hypothetical questions propounded to medical
experts must include all undisputed material facts and the material facts that are
included must be supported by the evidence. Berndt v. Dept., 44 Wn.2d 138, 265 P.2d
1037 (1954). It is error to admit the answer to a hypothetical question when there is
no testimony in the record as to the hypothesis upon which the question is based.
Salesky v. Dept., 42 Wn.2d 483, 255 P.2d 896 (1953).
so RCW 51.52.115.
515 Wn.2d 648, 105 P.2d 37 (1940).
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and the rule is now firmly established that this question is. for the
jury. 2
However, the Attorney General, supporting the Board's order, is
entitled to an instruction on the point, and it is to this matter that
the suggestion runs. A standard instruction requested in King County
is as follows:
INSTRUCTION NO.
You are instructed that the Workmen's Compensation Act provides
that the findings and decision of the Board of Industrial Insurance
Appeals shall be prima facie correct and the burden of proof shall be
upon the party appealing from the Board's order. Prima fade means
presumably. In this case the burden of proof is on the plaintiff.
Burden of proof means the burden of producing evidence which fairly
preponderates over the opposing evidence. By preponderance is meant
the greater weight of believable evidence. It does not require a greater
number of witnesses to produce a preponderance of the evidence but
rather it must be shown that the evidence which has been produced is
of greater weight.
You are further instructed that the decision of the Board is rebuttable
and is rebutted when you are satisfied that the evidence fairly pre-
ponderates against the findings of the Board.
[Alternative paragraph: You are further instructed that the deci-
sion of the board is rebuttable and is rebutted only if you find from a
preponderance of all the evidence that the Board's decision was in-
correct.]
If you are not convinced that the evidence fairly preponderates
against the findings of the Board, or if you are unable to determine
whether it does or does not, then the decision of the Board of Appeals
must stand.
[Alternative paragraph: If you find the evidence is evenly balanced,
the decision of the Board must stand.]
These instructions are prolix and replete with lawyer's language,
hardly the most effective medium for communicating ideas to laymen.
A simple, meaningful, and (it is believed) legally permissible instruc-
tion on the point would be as follows:
In reviewing the evidence you will presume that the Board's findings
are correct. You are not justified in overturning those findings solely
because you agree with the plaintiff and disagree with the Board or
because you are convinced that the findings urged upon you by the
plaintiff are as believable as the findings of the Board. You will over-
turn those findings only if the plaintiff has convinced you that the find-
ings he has urged upon you are more believable than those reached by
the Board.
L2 Preston Mill Co. v. Dept., 44 Wn.2d 532, 268 P.2d 1017 (1954).
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It is perhaps not too much to hope that the superior court judges,
particularly as they acquire more confidence in the work of the Board,
will, if they are asked to do so, instruct juries in terms that effectively
emphasize the presumptive validity of the Board's findings.
Department Procedures. Finally, the Board and the Department
might well direct their attention, if they have not already done so,
to the question of why, in the nearly nine years of its operation, the
Board has on the average affirmed less than half of the Departmental
orders upon which it has acted.5 It seems fair to suggest that when,
for example, 54 per cent of the Departmental orders appealed to the
Board are reversed or modified, as they were in 1957, a re-examination
of Departmental procedures is appropriate.
An evaluation of the Department's work is beyond the scope of this
paper. But there are at least two changes that should be helpful.
There is a startling lack of published information about the way the
Department actually operates. Presumably there is a set of rules,
regulations, and procedures followed in the Department. It should
be formalized and made available to interested parties, following the
practice established by the Board seven and a half years ago.5 '
Second, if the pre-hearing conference is a good technique for the
Board to use in disposing of cases quickly, fairly, and to the satisfac-
tion of the parties (including the Department), it would seem that
some of its specifics could effectively be employed at an earlier stage
in the processing of a claim. For example, perhaps the Department
should, as the Board does, permit the workman to designate one of
the doctors who serves on the panel of medical examiners. Appar-
ently this procedure has been reasonably effective at the Board level.
A workman, like most everyone else, is more likely to accept the word
of his own doctor than the word of the insurance company's doctor.
CONCLUSION
The present system of handling appeals under the Industrial Insur-
ance Act by having two de novo trials is a procedural aberration,
expensive and time-consuming. Rational reform calls for elimination
58 See Appendix B. It is also significant that the percentage of appeals taken from
Departmental orders has increased from less than one per cent of the total claims filed
in 1950 to about 1.5 per cent in 1956. The increase is only partly explained by the
industrial growth of the state.
54 See footnote 41. Indeed, RCW 51.04.020 requires the Director of the Department
to establish and promulgate rules governing the administration of the Act. Sections 2
and 3 of the Model State Administrative Procedure Act make it mandatory for each
agency to adopt such rules and to file a certified copy with the Secretary of State, who
is required to keep a permanent register of such rules open to public inspection. Sec-
tion 4 requires the Secretary of State to compile, index, and publish all agency rules.
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of either the jury trial or the administrative trial. Theoretical con-
siderations point to abolition of the former, but practical considera-
tions raise what appear to be insuperable obstacles to such a step.
The jury trial has played a role for the entire 47-year history of
workmen's compensation in this state. While its persistence is prob-
ably due in part to inertia, fetishism, and the fact that a good many
people (e.g. lawyers), have acquired a stake in its continuance, it is
doubtful that the jury trial could have survived for such a long period
of time without drawing on other sources for its vitality. There are
probably two major additional reasons for its strength: (1) dissatis-
faction on the part of workmen with the benefits afforded by the com-
pensation system; and (2) lack of confidence in the administrative
process.
All workmen's compensation acts are based upon a quid pro quo.
The workman gives up his common law tort remedy and receives
in exchange the promise of a speedy and certain statutory remedy.
On the other side of the bargain, the employer acquires the responsi-
bility of paying for the cost of that remedy and in return is relieved
of his common law liability.
In the absence of a controlling compensation statute a workman
who suffers industrial injury or disease can recover a common law
remedy from his employer if, but only if, he can prove negligence.
Moreover, he is up against a formidable array of common law defenses,
viz., assumption of risk, contributory negligence, and the fellow
servant doctrine. Accordingly, since a compensation remedy lies even
though the workman was negligent and his employer was not, it has
commonly been thought that the workman has the better of the
bargain.
However, in recent years this assumption has been the subject of
critical re-examination. 5 The tort remedy is uncertain, costly, and
exists only where there is fault, but it is worth a great deal more, in
money terms, than the compensation remedy. The tort remedy pur-
ports to cover all items of loss which the workman has suffered. The
compensation remedy does not. 6 The criticism has been sharpened
by comparison with such statutes as the Federal Employers' Liability
" SOMMERS & SOMMERS, WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION, 191 (1954).
11 See Franks v. Dept, 35 Wn.2d 763, 215 P.2d 416 (1950) (It is error to instruct
the jury to take the claimant's loss of earning power into consideration in determining
his permanent partial disability compensation). Compare Hand v. Greyhound Corp.,
49 Wn.2d 171, 299 P.2d 554 (1956).
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Act57 and the Jones Act"8 which provide railroad workers and seamen,
respectively, with a tort cause of action and a tort measure of dam-
ages, and which abolish the defenses of assumption of risk and the
fellow servant doctrine and provide that contributory negligence goes
only to the issue of recoverable damages.
The jury trial, while theoretically it has no place in the administra-
tion of a workmen's compensation system, has historically had sub-
stantive value to injured workmen in this state; that is, it has been
an effective way for them to get more money without meeting very
exacting standards of proof. It is too early to know whether the 1957
Amendments to the Washington Act, which increased the schedule of
statutory benefits and broadened the workman's opportunity to seek
a tort remedy when his injury is caused by an employer other than
his own," will work some change in this attitude.
There is no known, widespread disposition to abolish the industrial
insurance system and replace it with a statute patterned after the
Federal Employers' Liability Act. The compensation system, while
it may work to the disadvantage of those workmen whose injuries
are caused by negligence, does so to the benefit of the bulk of injured
workmen who would, absent a compensation statute, be without any
remedy. It is reasonable to think that the 1957 Amendments will
increase the degree of general worker satisfaction with the industrial
insurance system.
This will probably not be enough, however, to produce significant
diminution in the demand for jury trials unless the disposition of par-
ticular cases by the Department and the Board instills confidence in
the parties that claimants have received as much as, but no more
than, they are legally entitled to received.
The Department and the Board historically do not seem to have
inspired such confidence, particularly in workmen and their organiza-
tional representatives. An argument frequently made for retention
of the jury trial is based upon the allegation that the Department and
the Board, in making choices between conflicting medical opinions,
are disposed to accept the testimony of the department's witnesses
rather than that of the claimant's witnesses.
The Board's announced policy contravenes this allegation:
In making its decisions the board has adopted a rule of liberal con-
struction in favor of workmen. This is in line with the declared pur-
5735 Stat. 65 (1908), as amended, 45 U.S.C. §51 (1952).5838 Stat 1185(1915), as amended, 46 U.S.C. §688 (1952).
5 9 WAsH. SEss. LAws c. 70, pp. 282-289, 279-280 (1957).
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pose of the industrial insurance act itself as interpreted by the supreme
court. Where there is substantial conflict in credible testimony, doubts
are resolved in favor of the injured workman. This is not to say, how-
ever, that the decisions of the board are based upon emotional con-
siderations. The board insists that there be credible testimony to
support the claimed disability. It is believed, however, that by the
time the Board's decision has been made, the injured workman has
received every consideration that the facts in the record and the statute
permit.60
The merits of this controversy are beyond the scope of this paper.
However, the Board's stated policy conforms to the philosophy under-
lying the Act. It strikes a good balance between two opposed consid-
erations. A workmen's compensation act should be construed and
applied liberally, not strictly. But facts are neither liberal nor strict.
They are facts. A workman is legally entitled to compensation for
his injuries or his ill health if, and only if, they are factually related
to industrial accident or disease."'
If the policy is sound for the Board, it is also sound for the Depart-
ment. If the policy is followed at both levels, its application should
tend to instill confidence in workmen and should, together with the
suggestions made above, ultimately be reflected in a further reduc-
tion in successful appeals, not only from the Board to the superior
court but also from the Department to the Board.
It has become fashionable over the years to assume that special-
ized administrative agencies bring to bear on the questions that come
before them an expertise that makes it almost presumptuous to chal-
lenge their determinations, particularly as they relate to issues of fact.
The validity of such an assumption, broadly and loosely made, may
properly be doubted.
In one respect it is perhaps healthy that in this state easy indulg-
ence in the presumption of administrative superiority has not, because
of the jury trial, been possible. The Department and the Board have
been forced to earn the respect of the parties and the courts, which
is the best pragmatic test for determining the validity of such a pre-
80 Biennial Report 1951, Board of Industrial Insurance Appeals, p. 20.
61 There is nothing inhumane, no matter how appealing the claimant's case may be,
about decisions denying compensation because of failure of proof. See, for examples,
Mork v. Dept., 48 Wn.2d 74, 291 P.2d 650 (1955), and Berndt v. Dept., 44 Wn.2d 138,
265 P.2d 1037 (1954). Cf. Hastings v. Dept., 24 Wn.2d 1, 163 P.2d 142 (1945). On
the other hand, decisions that narrowly construe the coverage of the Act seem contrary
to its policy. See Purinton v. Dept., 25 Wn.2d 364, 170 P.2d 656 (1946). Cf. D'Amico
v. Conguista, 24 Wn.2d 674, 167 P.2d 157 (1946) ; Cugini v. Dept., 31 Wn.2d 852, 199
P.2d 593 (1948), and Muck v. Snohomish County P.U.D., 41 Wn.2d 81, 247 P.2d 233(1952). But see Pearson v. Aluminum Co., 23 Wn.2d 403, 161 P.2d 169 (1945).
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sumption. The record indicates that the Board has made progress.
Atrophy of the jury trial by reason of disuse, or its ultimate excision
by statutory amendment, depends primarily upon the quality of
future performance by the Board and, perhaps to an even greater
extent, by the Department.
APPENDIx Aa
Disposition of
Appeals from the Board to the Superior Courts
Appealable No. Appealed % Appealed No. Reversed % Reversed
Calendar Board to Superior to Superior by Superior by Superior
Yearb Orderse Court Court Courtd Court
1941 .................... 339 86 25 50 58
1942 .................... 346 155 45 96 62
1943 .................... 364 180 49 101 56
1944 ................... 271 148 55 106 72
1945 .................... 208 84 40 52 62
1946 .................... 256 141 55 120 85
1947 .................... 253 184 73 162 88
1948 ................... 455 328 72 268 82
1949 .................... 330 232 70 168 73
1950 .................... 360 169 47 132 77
1951 .................... 581 270 46 173 64
1952 .................... 611 306 50 145 47
1953 .................... 423 232 54 79 34
1954 ................... 487 250 51 98 400
1955 .................... 409 204 49 70 370
1956 .................... 418 185 44 73 540
a. This table and the table in Appendix B were put together from statistics found in
the Board's Biennial Reports for 1951, 1954, and 1956 plus other data obtained
directly from the Board.
b. The baseline in this table is the year the Board's order was entered. The table rep-
resents the final outcome of actual cases decided by the Board in the years indicated
regardless of the year of final disposition in the superior court.
c. The Board's Report in 1951 calculated the percentage of orders appealed to the
superior court by dividing the number of cases so appealed by the number of appeal-
able orders entered by the Board. The Reports in 1954 and 1956 calculated the per-
centage of orders appealed to the superior court by dividing the number of cases so
appealed by the total number of orders entered. including remands to the Depart-
ment, dismissals by agreement of the appellant, and settlements by prehearing con-
ference or stipulation. For purposes of the inquiry here the method of calculation
used in the 1951 Report seems more meaningful. Accordingly, the number of appeal-
able orders for the years 1951, 1952, 1953, 1954, 1955, and 1956 has been obtained
by substracting from the total number of orders issued by the Board the number dis-
posed of by remand, by dismissal, and by settlement. While a few of the dismissals
may have involved appealable orders, the figure derived is accurate enough for the
purpose of this study.
d. The Board includes out of court settlements as reversals because they usually involve
some modification of the Board's order.
e. This percentage was calculated against the number of superior court judgments thus
far received for the years 1954, 1955, and 1956 rather than the number of cases
appealed in each of those years. The figures are as follows: 1954: 246; 1955: 188;
1956: 136. It is reasonable to assume that the percentage of reversals will not be
significantly changed when all of the superior court judgments are received.
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APPENDIX B
Disposition of
Appeals from the Department to the Board
Final
Calendar Board
Year Ordersa
1950 ................ 506
1951 ................ 925
1952 ................ 1230
1953 ................ 983
1954 ................ 1396
1955 ................ 995
1956 ................ 1148
1957 ................ 1103
Departmental Orders Reversed or Modified
After Settlement by
Pre-Hearing Conference
After or Stipulationb
Hearing No. %c Total
173 146 29 319
289 253 27 542
258 390 32 648
167 324 33 491
142 539 39 681
130 385 39 515
164 429 37 593
151 441 40 592
Departmental
Orders
Affirmedd
No. %,
187 37
383 41
582 47
492 50
715 51
480 49
555 48
511 46
a. Fxcludes cases remanded to the Department for further proceedings.
b. Most of these settlements, if not all of them, are in effect reversals or modifications
of Departmental orders, and the Board so records them.
c. Number of settlements divided by number of final Board orders.
d. Includes appeals denied on the record, dismissals before or during hearing (usually
with agreement of appellant), and affirmances after hearing.
e. Number of affirmances divided by number of final Board orders.
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